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Forward operating bases are vulnerable to terrorist activity due to their location and 
limited resources. Threat awareness under these conditions is paramount to the safety of 
the personnel and to mission accomplishment. In the absence of the manpower required 
to maintain complete and continuous monitoring of the FOBs surroundings, an automated 
surveillance system is needed. The Smart FOB Surveillance System (SFSS) employs a 
multi-agent behavior analysis and decision system with Swarm Intelligence (SI) through 
a network-centric systems engineering method of development to create a robust 
surveillance system. The SFSS provides the capability of an intelligence automated 
system for continuously monitoring areas for certain behaviors, linking individuals, 
predicting future behaviors, and taking appropriate action against them to eliminate 
threats and the possibility of future threats. Environments, such as insurgent urban areas, 
Forward Operating Bases, country borders, and other high-value target areas all require 
constant personnel behavior surveillance and monitoring.  
The SFSS utilizes a complex network of aerial, fixed and mobile terrestrial units, 
capable of identifying and processing audible, visual, and signal intelligence in order to 
determine personnel behavior in a given area of interest as well as recording and 
processing intelligence data. The focus is on creating a system to protect Forward 
Operating Bases (FOB) by providing continuous and autonomous surveillance and threat 
alerts. In this manner, a Smart FOB Surveillance System (SFSS) will be designed in this 
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Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) are vulnerable to terrorist attacks and intelligence 
gathering by terrorists. Current methods of surveillance are manpower intensive and are 
unnecessarily dangerous to those performing these functions. FOBs must be provided 
with an effective surveillance system that can continuously monitor threat activity. 
The purpose of this thesis is to advise systems engineers in uniting Swarm 
intelligence and Multi-Agent intelligent systems in a Detect, Identify, Predict, React 
(DIPR) infrastructure to further enable our Network-Centric capabilities. Additionally, 
this thesis will present a systems engineering approach to the design of a Smart FOB 
Surveillance System (SFSS) with emphasis on a Network-Centric System application. 
This research will aid in the future unmanned systems and cyber world, where a 
paradigm shift is required toward intelligence automation. 
Future Network-Centric Warfare will be accomplished via unmanned systems, 
whether unmanned airborne, small satellites, unmanned carriers, unmanned ground 
systems, etc. With this paradigm shift, intelligence automation is a necessity to 
autonomously control these systems. In addition, the sensor data acquired from these 
systems, or any sensor network, must be analyzed through intelligence automation 
software, as opposed to intelligence automation analysts. There will never be enough 
facilities, humans, and bandwidth to handle the vast amount of data these unmanned 
systems will produce (Goshorn, Goshorn, Goshorn, & Goshorn, 2011). This thesis 
proposes to develop a Network-Centric Systems Engineering Solution, for intelligence 
automation, through applying the systems engineering process to design a Smart FOB 
Surveillance System (SFSS). 
The use of a multi-agent behavior analysis and decision system, with swarm 
intelligence through a network-centric systems engineering method of development, will 
create a robust and highly intelligent surveillance system. The system provides the 
capability of an automated and autonomous means of continuously monitoring areas for 
certain behaviors, linking individuals, predicting future behaviors, and taking appropriate 
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action against them to eliminate threats and the possibility of future threats. 
Environments, such as insurgent urban areas, Forward Operating Bases, country borders, 
and other high-value target areas all require constant personnel behavior surveillance and 
monitoring.  
The system utilizes a complex network of aerial, fixed and mobile terrestrial units, 
capable of identifying and processing audible, visual, and signal intelligence in order to 
determine personnel behavior in a given area of interest, as well as recording and 
processing intelligence data. The focus is on creating a system to protect Forward 
Operating Bases (FOBs) by providing continuous and autonomous surveillance and threat 
alerts. In this thesis a Smart FOB Surveillance System (SFSS) will be developed using 
the systems engineering process. 
Figure 1 is the Operational View of the Smart FOB Surveillance System (SFSS). 
There are three main signals that the system is intended to detect: visual signals, audible 
signals, and RF signals. The video data is taken by both the mobile UAV platforms that 
patrol the vicinity of the Forward Operating Base (FOB) and the fixed sensors located 
along the perimeter of the FOB. The video is analyzed for facial recognition to alert the 
Network Operations Center (NOC) operator, who is stationed within the FOB, of known 
threats based on local and remote database comparisons. Video is further analyzed by 
behavior recognition software. Behaviors deemed potential threatening such as unknown 
personnel approaching the FOB, persons in prone positions, and others will result in 
alerting the NOC operator for further disposition. Fixed sensors located along the 
perimeter of the FOB detect audio near the perimeter of the FOB. The audio received is 
sent to the NOC, within the FOB, for threat criteria evaluation. To meet a threat criterion, 
the audio received is evaluated by the NOC against audible threat profiles. The intent is 
to primarily detect gunfire and explosions. The audio source can also be located through 
simple triangulation based on the audio signal, received at the various audio sensors. 
Finally, radio frequency (RF) is detected by fixed sensors located along the perimeter of 
the FOB. The RF signal will be analyzed by three methods. First, the source of the RF 
signal can be determined by triangulation based on the RF signal received at various 
location sensors. Secondly, the RF signal will be compared to a database of threat 
 xix 
profiles. The intent is to detect jamming attempts, electronically guided munitions, 
electronically actuated Improvised Explosive Devices (IED), and finally, in the case of 
RF communications, to intercept the voice transmissions for recording and evaluation by 
the NOC operator. 
 
Figure 1. System Operational View of the SFSS. 
In any event where the Smart FOB Surveillance System (SFSS) generates an 
alert, the FOB will initiate defensive protocols to mitigate the risk of the threat and the 
NOC operator will be required to resolve the condition causing the alert. In addition, the 
FOBs headquarters will automatically be notified of the potential threat in order to 
provide assistance and to establish situational reporting with the operational chain of 
command and the global intelligence community. 
 xx 
This thesis provides a background on multi-agent systems, DIPR systems, Swarm 
Intelligence, automated intelligence, and the network-centric systems engineering 
approach to system design. With the background for the technologies encompassed in the 
system established, the thesis will then present a systems engineering approach to the 
design of a Smart FOB Surveillance System (SFSS) beginning with the operational 
requirements, operational concept and scenarios, external systems design, system 
requirements, then culminating in a complete design through the functional architecture 
hierarchy, functional architecture decomposition, and physical architecture hierarchy. 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Goshorn, R. E., Goshorn, D. E., Goshorn, J. L., & Goshorn, L. A. (May 2011). ―The 
Need for Distributed Intelligence Automation Implemented through Four 
Overlapping Approaches: Intelligence Automation Software, Standardization for 
Interoperability, Network-Centric System of Systems Infrastructure (with 







The author wishes to thank Professors Rachel Goshorn and Deborah Goshorn for 

















Future Network-Centric Warfare will be accomplished via unmanned systems, 
whether unmanned airborne, small satellites, unmanned carriers, unmanned ground 
systems, etc. With this paradigm shift, intelligence automation is a necessity to 
autonomously control these systems. In addition, the sensor data acquired from these 
systems, or any sensor network, must be analyzed through intelligence automation 
software, as opposed to intelligence automation analysts. There will never be enough 
facilities, humans, and bandwidth to handle the vast amount of data these unmanned 
systems will produce (Goshorn, Goshorn, & Goshorn, 2011). This thesis proposes to 
develop a Network-Centric Systems Engineering Solution, for intelligence automation, 
through applying the systems engineering process to design a Smart FOB Surveillance 
System (SFSS).  
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide a systems engineering approach to systems 
engineers, through uniting Swarm intelligence and Multi-Agent intelligent systems in a 
Detect, Identify, Predict, React (DIPR) infrastructure, to further enable our Network-
Centric Capabilities (Goshorn, Goshorn, & Goshorn, 2009). Additionally, this thesis will 
present a systems engineering solution to the design of a Smart FOB Surveillance System 
(SFSS) with emphasis on a Network-Centric System application. This will aid in the 
future unmanned systems and cyber applications, where a shift is required toward 
intelligence automation.  
C. QUESTIONS RESEARCHED 
1. How can Swarm technology be paired with a Multi-Agent Behavior 
Analysis and Decision System through a Network-Centric Systems 
Engineering Approach?  
2. What is Swarm Intelligence (SI)? 
 2 
3. What is a Multi-Agent System (MAS)? 
4. What is behavior modeling for Detection, Identification, Prediction, and 
Reaction (DIPR) in AI Systems? 
5. What is Network-Centric Systems Engineering (NCSE)? 
6. How can Swarm Intelligence be used to implement a Multi-Agent DIPR 
AI System?  
7. What NCSE solution would best illustrate proof of concept for a Multi-
Agent Behavior Analysis and Decision System with Swarm Intelligence? 
8. What are the systems engineering architectures for the NCSE solution? 
9. What is the systems engineering solution for a Smart FOB Surveillance 
System (SFSS)? 
10. What is the Operational Concept for Smart FOB Surveillance System (SFSS)? 
11. What is the Operational View (OV-1) for Smart FOB Surveillance System 
(SFSS)? 
12. What are the operational scenarios for the Smart FOB Surveillance System 
(SFSS)? 
13. What are the external systems for the Smart FOB Surveillance System (SFSS)? 
14. What are the system requirements for the Smart FOB Surveillance System 
(SFSS)? 
15. What is the Functional Architecture for Smart FOB Surveillance System (SFSS)? 
16. What is the Physical Architecture for Smart FOB Surveillance System (SFSS)?  
  
D. OVERVIEW 
A highly automated system that is designed to provide continuous surveillance for 
a FOB must be very adaptable and scalable. FOB environments in terms of the local 
populace, terrain, and surrounding threats vary widely. Therefore, the system should be 
intuitively tailored to match the needs of the FOB it serves. The application of swarm 
intelligence (SI) is a possible solution for built-in adaptability and scalability without the 
need for each SFSS to be independently designed for each individual FOB. Swarm 
intelligence (SI) is based on the interactions of animal colonies found in nature. Some 
colonies are found to behave as a collective group in the performance of a task instead of 
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a large number of individuals reacting independently. An individual, in this discussion, is 
one that only reacts to its environment; decisions and actions by an individual are carried 
out independently of the actions of other individuals (Bonabeau, Dorigo, & Theraulaz, 
1999). In order to accomplish this, the individuals interact with their environment as well 
as all other individuals that comprise the group in order to determine their own behavior 
in terms of the performance of tasks. SI is a specialized application of artificial 
intelligence (AI) (Ferby, 1999). In general, all types of AI systems react to the 
environment and choose an appropriate response or action based on the program 
application. The difference with SI is that instead of single AI agents acting 
independently, it acts collectively within the group for a common goal. In an AI 
environment, this can result in a substantial improvement in a systems performance and 
efficiency. Instead of directing each agent directly, the entire swarm can be directed and 
then able to self-organize to better accomplish its mission (Bonabeau et al., 1999).  
Recent Artificial Intelligence (AI) research has shown that intelligent software 
systems are the future in the design and development of next generation computing. 
Intelligent Software Agents (ISAs) are complex computer programs that on their own 
accord that do not require operator input to carry out their functions on the way to 
accomplishing a task. More frequently, applications of this technology require that 
multiple agents work together in a system. The result is the creation of an advanced 
multi-agent system (MAS) comprised of a collection of interfacing ISAs that perform at a 
much greater level than capabilities of their single agents. ISAs that are interfacing with 
their environment as well as each other are the foundation of SI. This form of distributed 
AI allows for maximum adaptability, redundancy, and scalability (Ferby, 1999).  
In the future, Network-Centric Command and Control Systems will rely heavily 
on the use multi-networked ISAs and MASs. The standard for the future development of 
U.S military based network-centric systems is the Net-centric Operations and Warfare 
Reference Model (NCOW RM) (DoDAF, 2007). The purpose of this model is to create 
net-centric systems that provide information dominance in that they link all users to 
receive and provide data on demand at any location and in any environment. There are 
four basic capabilities that such systems will have: Artificial Intelligence, automated or 
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semi-automated resource management, business enterprise services, and user interface. 
To satisfy the requirements of the Net-Centric Operations and Warfare Reference Model 
(NCOW RM), the use of ISAs and MSAs will be a necessity (DoDAF, 2007). 
To further enable these systems, decision-making must move from an operator 
function to an automated function. The ability of AI systems to mimic human decision-
making has been modeled in the Detection, Identification, Prediction, and Reaction 
(DIPR) process (Goshorn et al., 2011). Analogous to a human operator, information is 
received from the environment, then it is identified or classified, then analyzed to predict 
future actions based on what has already occurred, and finally acted upon. In the 
detection phase, various sensors provide input into the system, where raw data is initially 
processed by feature extraction algorithms (Goshorn et al., 2011). The identification 
subsystem carries out fusion of the features into an intelligent symbol. Prediction occurs 
in the following subsystem by analyzing the sequence of intelligence symbols, 
representing a behavior over time and space, identified in the environment. These 
predictions then solicit reactions based on predefined parameters; reactions could be 
automated ―rules of engagement‖ or recommended reactions (Goshorn et al., 2011).  
In a net-centric system, users and local applications depend upon common 
services for functionality and data. This type of system provides an information 
architecture that comprises communication, processing, and data exchange that can be 
used by a vast array of platforms. Engineering of this type of system will require that 
these systems be more centered on data-sharing versus application-sharing, which is 
currently more commonly used. A data centered architect will require an interface link 
between users as well as uniform input and output formatting to ensure compatibility. 
This net-centric systems approach results in a system capable of providing data to and 
from any station at any time automatically.  
There have been numerous frameworks, approaches, and methodologies for 
modeling and developing Multi-Agent intelligent systems and swarm intelligence. This 
thesis will focus on how a net-centric systems engineering approach can produce a 
superior union between Swarm intelligence and Multi-Agent intelligent systems in a 
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DIPR infrastructure. Models, architectures, and design and implementation of a proposed 
proof of concept tactical system will be discussed. 
Overall, this thesis will apply the systems engineering process to propose a 
systems solution through development of an operational concept and scenarios, external 
systems diagram, requirements, functional architecture, physical architecture, and 
operational architecture.  
E. APPLICATION 
A Swarm-based Multi-Agent Behavior Analysis and Decision System could 
provide a platform for civil, government, and military environments, which require 
constant surveillance in order to mitigate the threat of attacks of various types; most 
notably from within the civilian indigenous population who do not normally stand out as 
a recognizable threat. Such a system could provide a means of performing the task of 
constant monitoring in these environments to observe the numerous personnel, which 
may transit an area. The SFSS has the ability to identify behaviors classified as 
―Abnormal‖ for the purposes of detecting potential threat behavior. Simple human 
monitoring of audio, visual, or other media-based systems is severely limited in extended 
duration and capability, due to finite human useful attention span and identification of 
behaviors. However, the SFSS can perform these functions autonomously, indefinitely, 
and accurately. 
By providing a networked system of automated ―smart‖ sensors, the system can 
continuously monitor areas for certain behaviors and alert authorities to react to those 
behaviors in order to interdict the threat. With this type of system, the manpower required 
would be significantly reduced; additionally, potential friendly casualties will be reduced 
that could have resulted from the mission execution through man-power (not smart 
systems). This thesis research will focus on the use of this system in a Forward Operating 
Base (FOB); although this system can be used in any number of civil or military 
applications such as government installations, military bases, buildings, and other 
potential targets considered as high-value to an enemy, where the capability of constant 
personnel behavior surveillance and monitoring would be advantageous.  
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Integrating Swarm Intelligence (SI) into a Multi-agent Analysis and Decision 
System would further improve the degree of autonomy inherent in the SFSS Current 
efforts have focused on the capability to locate, classify, and track a Contact of Interest 
(COI); then identify ―Abnormal‖ behaviors, out of many other so-called ―Normal‖ 
behaviors, discern which of the abnormal behaviors could be classified as posing a threat, 
and then notify the appropriate personnel via various means (visual, electronic, audio, 
etc.) to react to the threat. However, the capability of a system- or operator-initiated 
reaction for obtaining additional information required for a specific COI does not exist. 
That is, a single command whether initiated by the system or its operator, only results in 
the action commanded. Integrating Swarm Intelligence (SI) into a Multi-agent Analysis 
and Decision System could result in a single command carrying out a series of commands 
aimed at following an event to resolution. Similarly, the legacy systems and approaches 
are incapable of reacting to other organic assets within the network in order to improve 
mission effectiveness. This thesis proposes a solution to this problem. The problem 
definition is discussed next. 
F. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
Currently, there are numerous environments in the civil, government and military 
spheres that require constant surveillance in order to mitigate the threat of attack from 
threats of various types; threats are mostly from the civilian indigenous population who 
do not normally standout as a recognizable threat (Woo, 2009). The task of monitoring 
these environments, to observe the numerous personnel that may transit an area, and have 
the ability to identify certain behaviors that would classify as abnormal, for the purposes 
of detecting potential threat behavior, is not possible using conventional humanized 
techniques. Simple human monitoring of audio, visual, or other media-based systems is 
severely limited in extended duration and capability, due to finite human attention span, 
identification of behaviors, and limited memory. Additionally, it is extremely dangerous 
for humans to carry out the monitoring by foot around bases.  
To protect our vital national interests, high-value assets at sea and ashore must be 
protected, and are therefore often nested within a network of internal and external, 
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organic and inorganic sensors. This arrangement provides a Common Operational Picture 
(COP) around the high-value units. These types of sensor networks increasingly have the 
ability to fuse some of the sensors’ data flooding in to detect, track, and, to a certain 
extent, classify the surface vessels in the vicinity of these units. Currently, humans in the 
loop of these sensor networks monitor the contact tracks of these vessels; however, their 
dense number and irregular, indiscernible, and unpredictable movements prevent an early 
and/or accurate detection of threat-like activity by the many contacts that must be 
monitored in the COP. Automation of these vital, yet mundane, monitoring and threat-
detection activities could potentially greatly enhance the awareness for the protection of 
friendly forces.  
G. PROPOSED SOLUTION 
A Smart FOB Surveillance System (SFSS) could give us the capability of an 
automated and autonomous method for continuously monitoring areas for certain 
behaviors, linking individuals, predicting future behaviors, and taking appropriate action 
against them to eliminate threats and the possibility of future threats. Environments, such 
as insurgent urban areas, Forward Operating Bases, and other high-value target areas all 
require constant personnel behavior surveillance and monitoring. A complex network of 
aerial, fixed and mobile terrestrial units capable of identifying and processing audible, 
visual, and signal intelligence in order to determine personnel behavior in a given area of 
interest would fill the capability gap identified. 
This thesis will develop the following Systems Engineering products: Operational 
concept, operational scenarios, external systems diagram, requirements, functional 
architecture hierarchy, functional architecture decomposition using IEDF0, physical 
architecture hierarchy, and operational architecture… 
This chapter provided an overview of the technology required to solve the 
problem presented and provided an introduction to a Multi-Agent Behavior Analysis and 
DIPR System with Swarm Intelligence. The next chapter will provide a literature survey 
for the background and provide a discussion on Network- Centric Systems Engineering 
methods, including how NCSE differs from traditional Systems Engineering and 
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Software Engineering, and it will discuss the NCSE methodologies and selection of 
desired methodology. 
H. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is organized as follows: 
1. Chapter I Introduction: This chapter will include the overview, questions 
researched and the thesis outline to include: Problem to Solve, 
Application, Motivation, and Proposed Solution for a Multi-Agent 
Behavior Analysis and DIPR System with Swarm Intelligence. 
2. Chapter II Network-Centric Systems Engineering Approach: This chapter 
will provide a literature survey for the background and provide a 
discussion on Network-Centric Systems Engineering methods, including 
how NCSE differs from traditional Systems Engineering and Software 
Engineering.  
3. Chapter III Application Of The Systems Engineering Process: This 
chapter will also discuss the Systems Engineering ―V‖ model used in the 
development of the functional architecture from the system level design 
requirements to the completed system. Finally, it will discuss the NCSE 
methodologies and selection of desired methodology. 
4. Chapter IV Swarm Intelligence and Multi-Agent Systems: This chapter 
will provide a background for swarm intelligence and multi-agent systems. 
The chapter will also discuss the need for Intelligence Automation (IA), 
the Detect, Identify, Predict and React (DIPR) method, and distributed 
Artificial Intelligence (AI), which is a form of DIPR. 
5. Chapter V System Engineering Solution for a Smart FOB Surveillance 
System (SFSS): This chapter will focus on the development of the Smart 
FOB Surveillance System (SFSS) by using the left side of the Systems 
Engineering Vee model. Beginning with the operational need an 
operational concept will be identified. This will trace into the various 
operationals scenarios that will be used to bound and scope the SFSS 
system design. From there, further Systems Engineering products, of the 
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SFSS, will be developed. This begins with the formation of the External 
Systems Diagram and flows into the requirements of the system. Finally, 
the functional, physical, and operational architectures are developed. 
6. Chapter VI Summary and Conclusion: This chapter will summarize the 
proposed systems solution of a Smart FOB Surveillance System (SFSS) 
and draw conclusions from the research performed. Additionally, future 
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II. NETWORK-CENTRIC SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 
APPROACH 
A. OVERVIEW 
Understanding of Network-centric systems is fundamental to the solution required 
in this thesis. Taking the network-centric systems engineering approach in the 
development of a solution will aid in defining the architecture vision, capabilities and 
attributes, warfare and operations, and engineering network-centric systems using agent-
based technology. 
The Joint Force Development and Integration Division defines the network-
centric capability as the ability to create an infrastructure that allows for the interaction of 
users and systems while providing data and information exchange freely and in a 
protected environment. Network-centric capability provides users with the information 
needed, when needed, and in a format that is coherent and useful (JCCD, 2011).  There 
are three key elements that comprise a network-centric system that in order to provide 
service-based information sharing and processing (NESI, 2009): 1) be functional to the 
user by providing intelligence based processing of information, 2) be completely 
interoperable with other systems and platforms, and 3) carry out its network operations 
independently (NESI, 2009). 
In order to engineer and implement these types of interconnected complex 
systems it is important to understand the following topics discussed later in this chapter in 
terms of their net-centric applications:  
 Architecture 
 Capabilities and Attributes 
 Warfare and Operations  
 Engineering through Agents  
B. NETWORK-CENTRIC SYSTEMS 
This section discusses relationship between network-centric systems and network-
centric systems engineering. The section delves into the various network-centric systems 
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engineering types such as top-down systems, bottom-up systems, middle systems, and 
side view systems; to include the differing information flows and under what 
circumstances one may be used of another.  
1. Network-centric Systems 
A network-centric system is the collaboration of humans and computers 
(hardware and software) in the performance of a task or function within a network 
environment.  Network centric systems function in a human and computer framework to 
provide a more efficient use of resources while acting to synchronize actions necessary to 
accomplish a mission. The term ―network-centric‖ implies that the system contains the 
attributes and can perform the capabilities discussed here in the following sections. 
2. What is Network-centric Systems Engineering? 
Network-Centric Systems Engineering (NCSE) is simply the design and 
development of a system created to operate in network-centric environments. This 
environment may be a local intranet or wide area network. The primary concern is 
whether the system enables discovery and access to its information; can another system 
within that environment find and access information. To operate in a network-centric 
environment a system must contain the network-centric attributes and enable the 
network-centric capabilities described in this chapter.  
The Network-centric Systems Core contains the basic fundamental components 
that any network or system of networks is built from; networks, communications, 
distributed computing and real-time processing. The major elements of network centric 
system engineering core evolved from three distinct functions: Communications 
(including an established network), real-time data processing, and distributed intelligent 
computing. There are four distinct but complementary NCSE systems: top-down, bottom-
up, middle, and side view/disadvantaged users (Goshorn et al., 2011). Each system can be 
viewed as a system. Therefore, NCSE is a system of systems (SoS). These four 
overlapping systems are integrated by the NCSE Core and Four Systems seen in Figure 2.  
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Figure 1.  NCSE Core and Four Approaches Tree (From Goshorn et al., 2011) 
a. Top-down System 
The Top-down System describes the high-level functions and provides the 
boundaries of the requirements and capabilities of a system. Each major system is broken 
down individually into subsystems until the most basic low-level requirements of the 
system are defined. The Top-down system focuses on how the system will share 
information. The way information is shared will depend by the design of the service 
oriented architecture (SOA), enterprise services, cloud computing, network capability, 
hardware/software employed, and user familiarity. The top-down system represents the 
collaboration environment, with the highest level of intelligence, that pertains to the users 
mission. In the top-down system the flow of information begins at the bottom and is 
pulled up (Goshorn et al., 2011).  
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b. Bottom-up System 
The emphasis of the Bottom-up System is on the actual elements of the 
network-centric system and the requirements and capabilities it provides to the 
warfighter. This systems represents the origination of data; whether from a sensor, 
manned or unmanned system, or human, etc. This system relies on the use distributed 
smart systems, which is done in part by the use of smart sensors. The bottom-up system 
collects and pushes data to a common location by the detection agents and software 
employed. The bottom-up system relies heavily on distributed intelligent systems and 
smart sensors. The goal is to provide processed data in the form that the user understands 
automatically to any location in the network (Goshorn et al., 2011). 
c. Middle System 
The Middle System fuses the top-down and bottom up views. Within this 
system is the data domain that uses the smart push/publish (top-down system) and smart 
pull/subscribe (bottom-up system). ―Smart‖ refers to the Artificial Intelligence (AI) used 
in this system to automate the push or pull of data. Smart systems are those enabled with 
AI decision support to perform the analyses typically performed by an operator. The goal 
of the middle system is to funnel data into a repository using a bottom-up system, and 
then retrieve the data from a top-down-system. This middle system is the world of ―smart 
distributed clouds.‖ Distributed clouds will need to receive the information from the 
bottom-up system, store and process the data, and allow for top-down systems to pull 
from these smart clouds. This is done without prompting by the user (Brandon, 2009). 
d. Side View (Disadvantaged User) System 
The Side View, or Disadvantaged User, system examines how 
communications is provided to and from a user that has disadvantaged communications; 
also known as a user at the tactical edge. A disadvantaged user could be have network 
connectivity, interoperable communications, incompatible security, stealth 
communications by choice). A user may have limited network connectivity due to their 
operating environment, mission, platform, or security posture. By definition these users 
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are coined ―disadvantaged users.‖ The success of a units mission relies heavily on their 
ability to communicate on a tactical network. The side view system focuses on the 
disadvantaged user in order to fill the resource gap (Brandon, 2009). A network-centric 
system must incorporate the disadvantaged users into the system design; it often becomes 
a create communications design problem to interoperate with disadvantaged users. 
This section described the four NCSE systems, from a system of systems 
view. The next section discusses the DoD Network-centric Architecture Vision. 
C. NETWORK-CENTRIC ARCHITECTURE 
The DoD Information Enterprise Architecture (DIEA) describes the goal of 
Network-centric Operations (NCO) and the priorities required in order to remove 
significant obstacles that must be overcome. The architecture outlined brings the DoD 
closer to realizing true Network-centric Operations (NCO). The DoD network-centric 
transformation is realized by setting priorities to focus on fundamental requirements. Five 
priorities are identified as areas of attention and investment to achieve network-centric 
based information sharing; NetOps Agility, Data and Services Deployment, Computing 
Infrastructure Readiness, Communications Readiness, and Secured Availability (DoD 
CIO, 2007). These priorities are briefly described in this section to understand the 
foundation for the network-centric capabilities and attributes. 
1. NetOps Agility 
NetOps Agility (NOA) allows the user access to information on demand from any 
node along a network. The user can also process, share, send or receive information in a 
secure computing environment. The operation and management of the GIG is set by 
NOA policy and protocols (DoD CIO, 2007).  
2. Data and Services Deployment 
Data and Services Deployment (DSD) removes the link between applications and 
the data and services they provide. This idea is based in part from moving from 
application-centered networks to information-centered networks to provide more 
accessibility. The goal of net-centricity is to remove the information stovepipes and 
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increase decision-making agility and speed to enable users to access information 
regardless of time or place (DoD CIO, 2007). 
3. Computing Infrastructure Readiness 
Computing Infrastructure Readiness (CIR) provides a common framework to 
ensure interoperability among DoD networks. This allows for the necessary processing 
and storage required of these networks. Computing Infrastructure Readiness (CIR) also 
ensures that data flow along networks can be controlled efficiently for the most efficient 
through-put (DoD CIO, 2007).  
4. Communications Readiness 
Communications Readiness (CR) provides the framework for uninterrupted 
communications throughout the Global Information Grid (GIG). This includes ensuring 
that the infrastructure is capable of handling the necessary bandwidth and information 
flow between all users on the GIG (DoD CIO, 2007).  
5. Secured Availability 
Secured Availability (SA) provides the needed security on the network. It allows 
users to access the network at any location and ensures that data received or sent has not 
been compromised.  
In this section, the DoD Information Enterprise Architecture and priorities to 
enable network-centric information sharing were discussed; the next section will discuss 
the capabilities and attributes of network-centric systems (DoD CIO, 2007). 
D. CAPABILITIES AND ATTRIBUTES 
The DoD Office of the Chief Information Officer (CIO) vision is to create a 
tactical military advantage by information dominance for us and our partners. This 
requires two fundamental elements (DoD CIO, 2003): 
 Creation of an infrastructure where data is shared, available and trusted 
throughout the Collaborative Information Environment (CIE). 
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 Creation of an agile Global Information Grid (GIG) that is information 
centered and operates seamlessly with all users across the enterprise.  
This vision is accomplished through the establishment of official capabilities and 
attributes for DoD network-centric systems. This section identifies the capabilities and 
attributes of network-centric systems.  
1. Network-centric Capabilities 
In an ideal network-centric environment, agents whether human or computer, can 
better protect assets by more effectively processing information and more efficiently 
utilizing resources. This will streamline the efforts of our forces and improve mission 
accomplishment. (NESI, 2007). 
Robust network-centric capabilities ensure an information advantage and gives 
our war fighting commanders a more clear picture of the battle space, which results in 
better decision making. Our joint forces and allies require access to relevant and accurate 
information in real-time. In parallel, they must be able to share battle space information 
securely in order to make the most informed decisions in an environment flooded with 
unprecedented quantities of operational data (DoD CIO, 2007). The Joint Net-Centric 
Operations (JNO) Tier 1 Joint Capability Area (JCA) is described as the ability exploit all 
components in a battle space, both human and technological, by the unit and their allies 
by creating a rich information environment that is secure and dynamic in any operational 
environment (JNO, 2007).  Figure 3 is the JNO Tier 2 Capability Areas and is broken 
down into five key elements:  
 Network Management: The ability to install and deploy the network in any 
environment and to ensure the network is optimized to maintain all 
network functions and utilize available resources.  
 Knowledge Management: The ability to share information and enable 
collaborative decision making in order to improve situational awareness. It 
also discusses the ability to create organizational hierarchies.  
 Information Transport: The ability of the network infrastructure to provide 
secure and continuous communications from anywhere to anywhere.  
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 Enterprise Services: The ability to identify, process, store, and share data 
and information.  
 Information Assurance: The ability to defend the network from attack to 
maintain security and continuity. It also outlines the ability to create and 
produce information in a smart environment.  
 
Figure 2.  JNO Tier 2 Capability Areas ((From JNO, 2007) 
2. Network-centric Attributes 
The Network-centric concept of operations, enabled by information superiority, 
improves war-fighting ability by linking sensor information to the decision makers 
directly. This connectivity between warfighters creates a clearly defined battle space that 
improves awareness and reaction time. This contributes to improved joint force 
survivability, lethality, and overall effectiveness (DoD CIO, 2003). To enable NCO, a 
system must possess certain attributes to ensure the required net-centric capabilities can 
be provided to the warfighters. 
The nine official net-centric attributes are seen in Table 1 (JNO, 2007):  
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Table 1.   Net-Centric Attributes (From JNO, 2007) 
In this section, the capabilities and attributes of network-centric systems were 
discussed; the next section will introduce Network-centric Operations and Warfare. 
E. WARFARE AND OPERATIONS 
1. Network-centric Warfare 
Network-centric Warfare (NCW) is the attempt to by the DoD to exploit the use 
of network based information systems in the current modern environment. The mission is 
also to enhance our war fighting capabilities by improving our network capabilities while 
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denying their use by others. The focus of NCW is on the behavior of humans in the 
networked environment. The hypothesis of the NCW theory is that force structure and 
protocols linked in a networked environment is more capable than forces that do not use 
net-centric information exchange (DoD, 2005). 
NCW leverages an information advantage to create a decisive war fighting 
advantage created by a complex network of tactical commanders apprised of the battle 
space in order to share information and improve awareness. When commanders share 
tactical awareness through net-centric information exchange they gain an advantage over 
the opposing force. This war-fighting strategy is supported by net-centric based systems, 
but is only made successful when used collectively and at the same time (DoD, 2005).  
Successful implementation of the NCW theory demands recognition of the four 
domains of warfare in which conflict takes place: physical, information, cognitive, and 
social. The interactions between these domains of conflict are illustrated in Figure 4. A 
brief description of the four domains from (DoD, 2005) is given below. 
1. Physical Domain: The physical domain is the traditional domain where troops 
physically exist. Elements in this domain can be measured comparatively easier 
than other domains.  
2. Information Domain: This is the area where information is received and 
processed. Communication, or information exchange, among commanders occurs 
here. This domain also encompasses methods of information gathering such as 
sensors, information that is shared, and the infrastructure that allows for sharing.  
3. Cognitive Domain: The cognitive domain is in the mind of the warfighter 
where decisive battle space concepts and tactics emerge.  
 4. Social Domain: The social domain describes human interactions, 
understanding, awareness, and decision-making.  
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Figure 3.  Information Age Warfare Domains of Conflict (From DoD, 2005) 
The concepts of NCW help to explain how this theory provides enhanced power 
of networked forces and the associated source of war fighting advantage. These four 
tenets of NCW as defined in (DoD, 2005) are: 
1. Net-centric communications improves the ability to share information. 
2. When information is shared, the collective situational awareness is improved. 
3. Collective situational awareness improvement results in a faster reactions and 
improved cooperative efforts. 
4. Faster and improved cooperative actions result in greater capabilities. 
The four basic tenets of NCW represent a realization of this new theory of war as 
a source of transforming an information advantage into a combat advantage. Figure 5 
shows how the tenets of NCW may be applied to the warfare domains.  
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Figure 4.  Tenets of NCW within the Warfare Domains (From DoD, 2005) 
The requirements of a net-centric joint force are illustrated in terms of the 
individual domains in which their most basic requirements lie. This in turn describes how 
they operate, function, and are integrated as a single unit (DoD, 2005). The requirements 
are defined as follows: 
 Physical Domain: 
− Networking of all elements; achieving secure and seamless connectivity. 
 Information Domain: 
− Receive and share information. 
− Process information to improve awareness. 
 Cognitive/Social Domains: 
− Improve collective situational awareness. 
− Collaboration of efforts 
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The fundamental idea to support the sources of power hypothesis of the NCW 
theory of war is that if the following three requirements are met, then the joint force will 
be capable of greater effectiveness in combat (DoD, 2001): 
 Improved collaboration in mission execution. 
 Improving responsiveness to the battle space environment. 
 Improving combat survivability and lethality. 
2. Network-centric Operations 
Network-centric Operations (NCO) is the application of NCW theory. Simply, 
NCW is the theory; NCO is the theory in action. NCO is the implementation of the 
concepts of NCW: Improved collaboration, responsiveness, survivability, and lethality 
(DoD, 2005).   
a. FBCB2 – Blue Force Tracker 
The Blue Force Tracker monitors the location of vehicles and aircraft 
using Global Positioning System (GPS) transmitters. The location is then tracked to 
create awareness within the battles space by the sharing of information through satellite 
networks. Friendly fire has been reduced as a direct result of FBCB2 implementation 
(DoD, 2005).  
b. Horizontal Fusion 
Horizontal Fusion provides the warfighter the ability to pull information to 
them as they move using a ―smart-pull‖ process, to provide near-real time situational 
awareness, sense making tools, collaboration, and critical intelligence information 
sharing. As a result, troops on the ground are better prepared to execute missions (DoD, 
2005). It is horizontal in that information is received from a level in various domains that 
makes sense to the user. This information is received from the fusion of sensors and other 
gather methods in a net-centric environment (DoD, 2005). 
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c. Collaborative Information Environment 
The Collaborative Information Environment (CIE) describes the 
infrastructure used to create the GIG. It encompasses the hardware and software that 
allows connectivity in information centered network. It is through this infrastructure that 
information sharing, collaboration, decision-making, and synchronization can occur.  
F. ENGINEERING THROUGH AGENTS 
Engineering through agents is an approach in which the network-centric 
capabilities and attributes identified are paired with available agent-based technologies. 
The following section discusses the use of agents to satisfy network-centric capabilities.  
1. Network-centric Science and Technology  
A host of information technologies provide capabilities needed to facilitate 
collaboration and information sharing. These technologies fall into the following 
categories: collection, exploitation, storage, retrieval, distribution, collaborative 
environments, presentation, Information Operations and Assurance, and the technologies 
that help extract knowledge and understanding from data and information. These 
knowledge-related technologies include a variety of analyses, modeling, simulation, 
problem solving, and other decision support tools (DoD, 2001). The implementation of 
NCW will require investment in technologies to facilitate the ability to enable the 
required capabilities to perform NCO. Some of these technologies include (DoD, 2001):  
 Agile and maintainable networks. 
 Information exchange.  
 Seamless interoperability. 
 Reliable Connectivity 
 Information management and distribution. 
 Information Assurance. 
It is now possible to consider the relationship between these technologies and the 
network-centric capabilities and attributes previously presented. Analyzing these 
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technologies provides insight into to what types of components may be required to 
achieve these capabilities within a network-centric system.  
Many of these technologies could best be implemented using agent-based 
systems. Agents are essentially the building blocks of AI. Distributed AI, Swarm 
Intelligence will be discussed in great detail in Chapter IV. Agent technology has been 
used for information integration, decision support and sensor data processing, as well as 
distributed collaboration and information management for rapid and accurate decision-
making and predictive planning. These are potential areas where autonomous software 
agents and multi-agent systems could be utilized for the development of network-centric 
systems (Jennings & Wooldridge, 1995). 
2. Agent-based Science and Technology  
The Department of Defense cited that in order to reach the network-centric 
capabilities outlined research must be done in the following areas (DoD, 2001): 
 Cooperative Processing/Decision Support Technology 
− Information integration (fusion & correlation) 
− Computer-aided reasoning  
− Co-operative software agents 
− Mediation agents 
 Human-machine Interface 
− Explanation agents  
− Alerting and cueing agents  
− Knowledge elicitation agents 
− Input/output for a stressing environment 
 Rapid, distributed modeling and simulation 
− Robust stochastic algorithms and processes 
− Automated learning 
− Distributed intelligent agents 
Applying these specific agent technologies listed to the network-centric 
capabilities and attributes previously identified demonstrates the types of agent-based 
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systems that could be employed within a network-centric system to achieve the required 
capabilities needed for these complex, interconnected systems.  
In this chapter, an overview of what is meant by network-centric was presented; 
including the architecture vision, capabilities and attributes, warfare and operations, and 
engineering network-centric systems using agent-based technology. The next chapter will 
discuss the application of the systems engineering process.  
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III. THE SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS 
This chapter will discuss the systems engineering process used to design and 
develop the systems engineering solution for the Smart Fob Surveillance System (SFSS), 
which includes identifying the operational need, concept, and scenarios as well as the 
development of the external systems diagram and requirements. From these systems 
engineering products the functional, physical, and operational architectures are 
developed.. These products will then be utilized to develop the proposed system solution. 
This chapter will discuss the Systems Engineering ―V‖ model on a step-by-step system to 
provide the foundation of the system from design, which is then taken into the right-half 
of the ―V‖ of fabrication, installation, and testing of the system. This thesis develops 
solutions corresponding to the left side of the ―V,‖ introduced in this chapter. 
A. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS 
Systems engineering is an engineering approach that incorporates all other engineering 
disciplines in which design and implementation is based on the system as a whole (Maier 
and Rechtin, 2000). In order to maintain the required engineering discipline, a process 
must be utilized that details system requirements so that when implemented, the design 
meets the requirements of the system. The eventual goal, of this thesis, is to produce an 
actual system that fulfills the requirements of enhancing continuous monitoring of high-
value targets previously discussed, while not eliminating much of the traditionally 
required personnel. The concept, external systems diagram, requirements, and functional 
architecture, physical architecture and operational architecute for such a system is 
provided in Chapter V.  This chapter gives a background on these systems engineering 
products. After a brief analysis of alternatives, a specific solution will be proposed in 
Chapter V. 
B. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING V-MODEL 
This thesis will carry out the top left part of the systems engineering ―V.‖ The 
specific systems engineering products that will be developed are described next. Figure 6 
illustrates the Forsberg and Mooz Systems Engineering Vee. The left side is the 
 28 
decomposition and definition phase. It begins at the very top left with understanding the 
user requirements and developing the system concept and validation plan. In the next 
phase, which moves from the bottom to the top right, the system is developed and 
performance specifications are defined (Forsberg and Mooz, 1992). To reach these goals, 
several systems engineering products must be developed; they are explained generically 
in the next sections (Buede, 2000). 
 
Figure 5.  Systems Engineering Vee (From Forsberg and Mooz, 1992) 
1.  Operational Requirements 
To fill a capability gap or need, a solution must be developed that satisfies the 
condition. In order to do this the solution must be bound in scope. These are the 
operational requirements. They define what must be done in order to fill the need. They 
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must be very succinct and exclusive to eliminate ambiguity in the systems development. 
This is in essence the purpose of the system (Buede, 2000). 
2. Operational Concept 
Once the purpose of the system is defined, then the vision for what the system is 
to become is developed. Operational concept is also known as the concept of operations 
(CONOPS). This includes how the system will operate, in its planned operating 
environment, from the stakeholders’ perspective.  The operational concept should discuss 
how the system is to operationally function in order to satisfy the stakeholder needs and 
how it will be manned, maintained, and deployed. The operational concept also includes 
a list of scenarios for which the system is designed to operate and meet (Buede, 2000). 
3. Operational Scenarios 
Operational scenarios describe every situation for which the system is designed to 
perform. The scenarios define how the system will respond to various environmental 
inputs and the resulting outputs. They do not describe how the system will perform these 
tasks, but rather how the system will process inputs and produce outputs (Buede, 2000). 
4. External Systems Diagram 
The External Systems Diagram (ESD) bounds the system in the design space. The 
external systems that interact with the system are defined as well as the system inputs, 
outputs, and constraints. The ESD models the system interactions at the boundaries of the 
system as they reach outside the system and into external systems (Buede, 2000). 
5. Requirements 
The requirements define system specifications, which the system design is 
required to meet, based on the needs and objectives of the stakeholders. The system 
design must meet these specifications. Requirements trace back to ESD, CONOPS and 
scenarios. 
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6. Functional Architecture Hierarchy 
The functional hierarchy depicts what the system must do. The functional 
architecture hierarchy contains the hierarchy of the functions performed. The functions 
are based on the requirements needed to implement a system that can perform the 
scenarios previously described.   
7. Functional Architecture Decomposition 
Using IDEF0 modeling, each level of the functional architecture hierarchy 
is decomposed and modeled in terms of input and output requirements to specific 
functions. Each level of the functional architecture decomposition is traceable to the 
previous functional architecture hierarchy level (discussed in 6 above). The modeling of 
the system also illustrates all of the associated inputs to and outputs of the systems 
functions. This process is continued until the system has been decomposed to a single 
functioning component. 
8. Physical Architecture Hierarchy 
The physical architecture is modeled in a hierarchal format. It defines the 
physical resources that map to each individual function illustrated in the functional 
architecture hierarchy.  
9. Operational Architecture 
The operational architecture is where the physical and functional 
architecture map to each other. Each element of the physical architecture must match to a 
function, in a one-to-one fashion. It is the complete description of the system design. 
C. DOD SYSTEMS ENGINEERING V-MODEL 
In addition, the systems engineering ―V‖ can be viewed from a Department of 
Defense (DoD) acquisitions point of view. The Systems Engineering Process is a 
problem solving approach (Department of Defense, 2001, 31). In the development of the 
generic architecture, proposed system solution, and implementation of an instantiated 
physical architecture, the systems engineering V-model was utilized (DoDAF, 2007). The 
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generic architecture is a simplified approach that identifies and focuses on only the key 
elements of the system. This model can be broken down into distinct phases as displayed 
in Figure 3. A new system design should start on the left side of the ―V‖ with the system 
concept to establish the system level design requirements. Then continuing down the 
upper-left side of the ―V,‖ item level design requirements are established. This Systems 
Engineering V-model has predetermined review points along the way, where a detailed 
review is conducted to ensure the system is ready to move into the next phase. Once the 
design is completed at the bottom of the ―V,‖ then the fabrication, integration, and testing 
phases can begin, at the bottom of the ―V‖ and moving up the right side of the ―V.‖ 
 
Figure 6.  Systems Engineering V-Model (From DoDAF, 2007) 
D. PROBLEM DEFINITION AND SYSTEM CONCEPT 
The initial phase of a project starts with defining a problem or identifying a 
capability gap that needs to be filled. This phase describes what could be built or 
procured in order to fill the need and can result in the formulation of the idea for a 
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system. This initial phase does not establish that a system will be built; it only states that 
a system could fill a need and that further evaluation should be conducted. 
Maintaining security and situational awareness over high value areas is a difficult 
and man-power intensive task based on the force structure of our military and other 
government agencies. A need exists for a system for use in the civil, government, and 
military environments that require constant surveillance in order to mitigate the threat of 
attacks of various types; most notably from within the civilian indigenous population who 
do not normally stand out as a recognizable threat. The Smart FOB Surveillance System 
(SFSS) provides a means of performing the task of constant monitoring in these 
environments to observe the numerous personnel who may transit an area. The system 
must have the ability to identify behaviors classified as ―Abnormal‖ for the purposes of 
detecting potential threat behavior, is daunting, to say the least. The system should 
autonomously perform what simple human monitoring of audio, visual, or other media-
based systems is severely limited in extended duration and capability, due to finite human 
useful attention span and identification of behaviors. 
The solution for FOB protection should provide a networked system of automated 
―smart‖ sensors, which can continuously monitor areas for certain behaviors and alert 
authorities to react to those behaviors in order to interdict the threat. This system can be 
used in any number of civil or military applications such as government installations, 
military bases to include Forward Operating Bases (FOB), buildings, and other potential 
targets considered as high-value to an enemy where the capability of constant personnel 
behavior surveillance and monitoring would be advantageous. 
E. SYSTEM LEVEL DESIGN REQUIREMENTS AND ARCHITECTURE 
The requirements and architecture phase is where the generic architecture for 
system development is created and the system requirements are defined. The architecture 
provides a top-down view of the system. This phase results in a well-defined system 
architecture that has clear linkages to requirements. The architecture properly links to the 
previous phase, so that the system to be built meets the original needs. In the case of the 
system solution, an operational concept was developed, which provides all of the 
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necessary information in order to create scenarios in order to perform future simulations. 
The simulations can then be run utilizing different solutions to address the problem 
defined at the beginning of the operational concept. From the operational concept, the 
generic system architecture is created. The generic system architecture consists of the 
external system diagram, requirements, and functional architecture for the generic 
system. 
1. Analysis of Alternatives 
The analysis of alternatives (AOA) is a process that looks at the required need, the 
generic architecture, and identifies potentially viable solutions. Assessments are 
performed on each possible solution evaluating for effectiveness, achievability, cost, and 
viability (United States Air Force, 2008). Once an AOA is complete and a solution has 
been chosen for further development then the item level design can begin. 
F. ITEM LEVEL DESIGN REQUIREMENTS 
After one executes an AOA, the next step is to define the proposed alternatives 
physical architecture through the item level design requirements phase. These detailed 
specifications provide the bottom-up system design by breaking up the larger system into 
individual sub-systems and then breaking up the subsystems into components. This thesis 
selects a particular solution and provides its instantiated physical architecture. 
Additionally in this phase of the ―V,‖ the test and evaluation plans, to include acceptance 
tests, are developed. The acceptance must ensure that the needs described in the initial 
phase are satisfied. At the conclusion of this part of the process, all design requirements 
are complete, the upper-left side of the Systems Engineering ―V,‖ and the system is ready 
to begin fabrication, integration and test phases. 
G. FABRICATE, INTEGRATE, AND TEST 
As one moves from the bottom of the ―V‖ and up the right side of the ―V,‖ the 
design that was formulated in the previous sections is turned into a real system. First, 
individual components are acquired or built and assembled into sub-systems (Buede, 
2000). Then, unit tests are performed on these sub-systems. After the sub-systems have 
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been created and their unit tests have been satisfactorily performed, these sub-systems are 
ready for integration into the larger system (Buede, 2000). 
The systems integration step is where all of the components and sub-systems are 
assembled and integrated into a complete working system (Blanchard & Fabrycky, 2006). 
The integration includes debugging of all software and testing of the complete integrated 
system. The complete system operation is verified when an acceptance test is 
demonstrated to and approved by the stakeholders. The acceptance test is the same test 
that was agreed upon earlier with the systems stakeholders, but due to any engineering 
change orders, the acceptance test may have incurred minor changes during the build 
cycle. All parties involved must agree upon any changes that have occurred. Upon 
successful completion of the acceptance test, the system is delivered to the entity that 
paid for its construction, and a determination for further orders is made. Fabrication and 
integration is where the majority of the time and work on the system occurs. However, it 
will only be successful if the earlier design was performed correctly. 
To conclude, a Systems Engineering V-model yields an achievable roadmap for 
system creation. Additionally, the Systems Engineering V-model will be utilized in this 
thesis for the design of a generic architecture for the Smart FOB Surveillance System 
(SFSS). The next chapter discusses the basic concepts of Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) 
and introduce Artificial Intelligence (AI), Detection, Identification, Prediction, and 
Reaction (DIPR) Process, ISA, and MAS as an employment of distributed artificial 








IV. SWARM INTELLIGENCE AND MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS 
This chapter discusses the use of intelligent automation as a method of data 
collection and processing. Intelligent automation provided by Multi-agent Systems 
(MAS) is desired because it provides more capability albeit more complexity. This 
chapter then discusses MAS characteristics that must be considered for proper 
implementation and the benefits of using distributed vice centralized artificial 
intelligence. Finally, this chapter will discuss the culmination of these ideas in the 
concept of Detect, Identify, Predict, React (DIPR) as an MAS, which is essential to the 
Smart FOB Surveillance System (SFSS) design.   
A. OVERVIEW 
Swarm Intelligence (SI) is an example of a Multi-agent System (MAS). A MAS is 
one that is comprised of many individual intelligent agents. The agents are autonomous; 
however, they interact within the network and communicate with other agents on the 
network. This includes interaction with human operators, the hardware, and software that 
comprise the MAS system. These intelligent agents can be anything from an individual 
software program to a collection of hardware and software that make up a robotic entity. 
The agents contain the necessary software for decision making in order to eliminate the 
need for human operation. Engineering through agents, which was discussed in Chapter 
II, is an approach in which the network-centric capabilities and attributes identified are 
paired with available agent-based technologies. This chapter will introduce and discuss 
Artificial Intelligence (AI), Detection, Identification, Prediction, and Reaction (DIPR) 
Process, ISA, and MAS as an employment of distributed artificial intelligence. In this 
chapter, the following topics will be covered: 
 What is Intelligence Automation? 
 What is a MAS? 
 Why distributed AI? 
 What is a DIPR? 
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B. INTELLIGENCE AUTOMATION 
In today’s environment, there is a significant need for automation of our data 
collection and processing capabilities. It is no longer practical or possible to gather the 
required actionable intelligence through conventional methods. The volume of data that 
must be processed is too immense for our current resources. Figure 7 below describes the 
three driving factors that require a change in our data gathering approach. Predicting and 
preventing terror or crime, Consumer needs, and the current economic crisis all push for 




Figure 7.  The Need for Intelligence Automation, and the Four Approaches Required 
 to Implement Automation (From Goshorn et al., 2011) 
There are four approaches designed to meet the need for automation: The need for 
intelligence automation, the need for standardization for interoperability, the need for 
network-centric system of systems, and a need for new sensors. In the development of the 
Smart FOB Surveillance System (SFSS) the first approach is being used (Goshorn et al., 
2011). 
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1. Intelligence Automation 
Intelligence automation is needed in order to rely less on manpower to carry out 
data collection and processing functions. In systems that are laden with various sensors 
and processing requirements, the bandwidth required could quickly overwhelm a systems 
network.  An autonomous intelligent automation system designed for efficiency could 
alleviate this problem (Goshorn et al., 2011). 
C. MULTI-AGENT SYSTEM 
A multi-agent system (MAS) is defined as a system comprised of many individual 
intelligent agents that interface and operate collectively in the performance of a single 
overarching goal. These individual agents each carry out their own functions, which 
cumulatively perform the larger task (Padhy, 2005). The use of a MAS system is much 
more complicated than an individual agent. The interaction of individual agents that 
make up the MAS must be analyzed to ensure the proper application of groups of agents. 
Typically a bottom-up approach is taken to determine the interactions of the agents. As a 
result, multi-agent system (MAS) system design is much more complex. Relationships 
and the method that the ISAs communicate with one another must be considered. In 
addition, task hierarchy and responsibilities must be defined and incorporated into the 
overall system. Finally, software applications must be specifically designed with MAS 
applications in mind (Weiss, 1999).  
The general MAS characteristics are as follows (Vlassis, 2007): 
1. Agent Design 
The individual agents that comprise MASs are not required to be alike. They may 
be the same or similar, or they may also be very dissimilar; which is the case in a 
complex MAS. The only requirement is that they have the ability to interact seamlessly. 
2. Environment 
Static environments generally only require a simple individual agent. The AI 
embedded technology is capable of handling these types of scenarios. However, the 
solution to dynamic environments requires a complex MAS. 
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3. Perception 
Each agent perceives sensed information at their own location, time, and context. 
This results in each agent receiving bits and pieces of the actual environment. This data 
must have the ability to be melded in order to create a clear picture of the information 
received.  
4. Control 
Command and control of the individual agents in an MAS is done from within the 
agent. The MAS has the capability of deciding which actions to perform. Control is 
distributed among each agent instead of being centralized.  
5. Knowledge 
Due to the differing perceptions of each agent, it is necessary for the individual 
agents to share knowledge about their environment and with input from other agents, 
have the ability to coalesce perceptions to reach common environmental knowledge.  
6. Communication 
Every agent of an MAS must have the ability to transmit as well as receive data 
from other agents. This requires that they have a common communications format to 
include software compatibility.  
Robust intelligent systems tend to use many agents for the following reasons 
(Vlassis, 2007): 
 Speed is improved due to parallel processing. 
 Reliability is improved since single agent failures do not cause system failure.  
 Interoperability is improved since agents from one MAS can be used 
interchangeably with agents from another 
 Application flexibility is improved because the number of agents can be changed 
based on the operational needs of the environment. 
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D. DISTRIBUTED ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (DAI) 
Distributed Artificial Intelligence (DAI) is the decentralization of the tasks 
performed by individual agents. Although the individual agents act collectively as a 
group to perform a common goal, the processes and functions performed are spread out 
among the collection of agents. This concept lends itself NCW applications especially 
when implementing a system composed of numerous systems and subsystems within a 
single unified system.  
E. WHY DISTRIBUTED AI? 
As discussed previously Intelligent Automation is necessary in todays 
environment. For very similar reasons, distributed intelligence is also needed in complex 
sensor-based MASs. The reasons for this are outlined in the following section (Ferber, 
1999): 
 Distributed systems are more flexible. They can adapt to environmental 
changes as well as system requirements more easily. 
 Military applications generally encompass many locations or a widely 
dispersed area.  
 Distributed systems can be sized according to the required capability. 
 Networking and interfaces among networks inherently require distribution. 
 Networking of forces (and sensors) compels a distributed view. 
 The problem solving for which these systems are designed for require that 
multiple parallel and serial steps be performed. 
 To reach the level of automation required by todays surveillance based 
systems, detection, identification, prediction, and reaction (DIPR) systems 
must be automated. 
Distributed Automated Intelligence is an absolute necessity for future NCW 
systems. The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) has resulted in our requirement to 
process more information than ever before. Current resources prevent adequate detection 
and prevention of these threats unless these functions can be highly automated. In 
addition, behavior prediction models such as detection, identification, prediction, and 
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reaction (DIPR) systems must distribute automation in order to handle the necessary 
processing required to stay with demand of these sensor-based systems (Goshorn et al., 
2011).  
F. DIPR AS A MAS 
A DIPR system inherently contains many MASs. Each function of DIPR is 
comprised of an MAS in that they carry out sub-functions that collectively perform the 
common overall goal, which is to receive sensor input and then process the information 
to provide an appropriate response (Schafer, 2009).    
The concept of a Detect, Identify, Predict and React (DIPR) system is illustrated 
below (Figure 8). Information is received by sensors. Raw sensor data is sent to detection 
software that places the data in a spatial-temporal feature matrix. The identification 
function processes the data, by fusing these spatial-temporal features, to output intelligent 
states of the information received. These intelligent states are inputted to the prediction 
function, over time, creating a sequence. This sequence of intelligent states forms a 
behavior. The prediction function then classifies the behavior and then infers predicted 
behaviors outcomes. Finally, predicted behaviors actuate an appropriate reaction response 
(Goshorn et al., 2011).  
 
Figure 8.  DIPR System (From Goshorn et al., 2011) 
1. Detection 
Raw sensor data feeds the detection subsystem of DIPR. This subsystem receives 
data from the various sensors enabled to provide input. They can be any type of sensor 
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including video, audio, or RF, among others. The feature information extracted from each 
sensor input is based on end user needs, the behavior modeling technique, and the type of 
signal detected. From this input, the detect function outputs a spatial-temporal matrix that 
captures data as packets in space and time. The result is a feature space matrix 
representing the data detected. Figure 9 below describes the feature space matrix. 
Matrices represent a single snapshot of features, over space, at a given moment in time. 
As time elapses, multiple matrices are formed, which create a three-dimensional matrix 
describing the spatial and temporal features of the data. In addition, to these features 
differentiation calculations can be performed to create time rate of change features 
(Goshorn et al., 2011). 
 
Figure 9.  Feature Space Matrix (From Goshorn et al., 2011) 
2. Identification 
The identification subsystem receives the temporal feature space matrix from the 
detection subsystem and outputs an intelligent state symbol when a feature meeting 
threshold requirements is observed at a given time increment. These intelligent states are 
dictated by operating rules that are established by the operator. The intent is to sift 
through incoming data and pull out features that are of interest to the end user.  Figure 10 
illustrates the operation of the identification function. Once the features and spatial-
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temporal attributes are processed by the temporal (features, space) module, the signals are 
fused and compared against intelligence rules to determine whether an intelligent state is 
triggered. If so, the intelligent state symbol is an output to the next DIPR subsystem 
(Goshorn et al., 2011). 
 
Figure 10.  Identification Subsystem of the DIPR System (From Goshorn et al., 2011) 
3. Prediction 
Figure 11 shows the prediction subsystem of the DIPR system. The main function 
of this subsystem to perform the high-level behavior classification and infer future 
behaviors. Intelligent states outputted from the identification subsystem are inputted into 
the prediction subsystem. The behavior classifier module groups sequences of intelligent 
states and then classifies these sequences in terms of their syntactical behavior. This is 
where behaviors are deemed normal or abnormal. These behaviors are then paired with 
inferred predicted outcomes as defined by the user. This output then becomes the input to 






Figure 11.  Prediction Subsystem (From Goshorn, 2011). 
4. Reaction 
The reaction subsystem matches predicted behavior outcomes to appropriate 
system responses. This could result in warnings or alarms. This could also prompt the 
system operator for further information or action. In an automated surveillance 
environment this could also prompt further information gathering by the systems sensors. 
The reaction subsystem recommends or automates ―rules of engagement.‖ The reaction 
subsystem can be seen as part of the entire DIPR system in Figure 13 below. This 
subsystem is integral in the creation of a true NCW system designed to automate decision 




Figure 12.  Intelligent Hierarchy Implements DIPR System  (From Goshorn, Goshorn, 
Goshorn & Goshorn 2010) 
This chapter discussed the need for Intelligent Automation (IA), and more 
specifically, the need for Distributed Intelligent Automation (DIA). The chapter also 
addressed the difference between a single-agent system and a Multi-Agent System 
(MAS) and how an MAS readily lends itself to military and sensor-based systems. 
Finally, the automated DIPR concept was explained. The next chapter will discuss the 
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V. SYSTEM ENGINEERING SOLUTION FOR A SMART FOB 
SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM (SFSS) 
This chapter will focus on the development of the system by using the left side of 
the Systems Engineering Vee model beginning with identifying the operational need and 
operational concept. From the operational need and operational concept, the various 
operational scenarios are defined that will be used to bound and scope the system. From 
there further Systems Engineering products can be developed. The External Systems 
Diagram is developed and flows into the requirements of the system. Finally, the 
functional, physical, and operational architectures are developed. 
A. OPERATIONAL NEED 
Forward Operating Bases (FOB) are vulnerable to terrorist attacks and 
intelligence gathering. Current methods of surveillance are manpower intensive and are 
unnecessarily dangerous to those performing these functions. FOBs must be provided 
with an effective surveillance system that can continuously monitor threat activity. 
B. OPERATIONAL CONCEPT 
A FOB will be monitored by both fixed and mobile sensors. The fixed sensors 
will monitor the FOBs immediate perimeter by way of video, Radio Frequency (RF), and 
audio sensors. The mobile sensors will be deployed as an integral part of a collection of 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) operating within a Swarm Intelligence framework. 
Multiple video-sensor equipped UAVs will patrol and monitor the vicinity of the FOB. 
The number of UAVs will be based on the approximate size and threat density specific to 
the particular FOB. A Network Operating Center (NOC) will be established within the 
protected boundaries of the FOB. The NOC will receive sensor data from both the fixed 






initially be processed by the Swarm based UAVs, then send the intelligence data to the 
NOC for final processing. The NOC will perform all of the behavior analysis, alert 
functions, and database management functions based on the processed fixed and mobile 
intelligence data. 
C. OPERATIONAL OVERVIEW 
The Operational View (OV-1) is a fundamental systems engineering product. The 
OV-1 depicts the high-level operational concept of the mission that the system is 
intended to perform (DoDAF, 2007). Figure 14 describes the system in terms of the 
operational environment, technologies involved, equipment used, and the communication 
that occurs between the components.  
On the most basic level, the Smart FOB Sensor System (SFSS) is a surveillance 
system that continuously and autonomously receives signals from the environment 
passively and actively. For every instance that a signal received meets the criteria for a 
potential threat, the source of the signal is labeled as an Object of Interest (OI). These OIs 
will be tracked for further evaluation until the threat criteria no longer exists. In addition, 
OIs initiate a heightened priority for evaluation, which results in more intensive 
observation by the Swarm UAVs. 
There are three main signals that the Smart FOB Sensor System (SFSS) is 
intended to detect: visual signals, audible signals, and RF signals. Visual signals are 
sensed actively by both the fixed and mobile sensors. Video captured by the UAV is 
processed on board for facial recognition and video for behavior analysis is sent directly 
to the Network Operations Center (NOC). Video captured by the fixed sensors are sent 
directly to the NOC for facial recognition and behavior analysis processing. The multi-
directional signal interaction between the UAVs and between the UAVs and NOC are  






facial recognition of known terrorist threats or by behavior analysis of the movements of 
the OIs. The OV-1 graphic shows six black dots, which represent a group of unknown 
persons that require threat evaluation. Audible signals are passively received by the fixed 
sensor network located along the perimeter of the FOB. The audio received is sent to the 
NOC for threat criteria evaluation. To meet a threat criterion, the audio received is 
evaluated by the NOC against audible threat profiles. The intent is to primarily detect 
gunfire and explosions. The audio source can also be located through simple triangulation 
based on the dB level of the various audio sensors receiving the signal. As with all 
signals that meet a threat criterion, the signal source will be labeled as an OI and initiate 
more intense observation by the Swarm UAVs. The OV-1 graphic shows a representation 
of a red explosion that requires threat evaluation. The final signal sensed is RF signals 
passively sensed by the fixed perimeter sensors. The OV-1 graphic shows its 
representation by a transmitting antenna. The RF received is sent to the NOC for threat 
criteria evaluation. To meet a threat criterion, the RF received is evaluated by the NOC 
against RF threat profiles. The intent is to detect jamming attempts, electronically guided 
munitions, electronically actuated Improvised Explosive Devices (IED), and in the case 
of RF communications, to intercept the transmission for recording and evaluation by the 
NOC operator. The RF source can also be located through simple triangulation based on 
the signal level of the various RF sensors receiving the signal. As with all signals that 
meet a threat criterion, the signal source will be labeled as an OI and initiate more intense 




Figure 13.  System Operational View 
D. OPERATIONAL SCENARIOS 
The operational scenarios discussed below will be used to scope the architecture design 
of the system. The operational scenarios will scope the operational need to the expected 
threat environment. The architecture of the system will include the development the 
external systems diagram, the functional architecture hierarchy, functional architecture 






1. Normal Steady State Operation 
Normal steady state operation is defined as the system functioning and monitoring 
all sensory data. However, no sensory data is received that would initiate an Object of 
Interest (OI) protocol. The fixed sensors are scanning the immediate area of the FOB for 
visual, audible, and RF signals that meet criteria to initiate further investigation and 
signal processing by the Behavior Analysis Module. The UAV deployed mobile visual 
sensors are also receiving data that does not meet criteria for further processing. In this 
instance, the Swarm based UAV fleet will maintain normal flight patterns and no alerts 
are received by the Network Operations Center (NOC) Operator from the Smart FOB 
Surveillance System (SFSS). 
2. Visual Signal Criteria Met/Facial Recognition Matches Non-threat 
Persons approaching the FOB are captured on video by the mobile UAV Swarm 
and /or the fixed video sensors along the FOB perimeter. The video is analyzed onboard 
the UAVs by a facial recognition program. Video received by the fixed sensors is sent to 
the NOC directly for analysis. The Facial recognition images captured are sent to the 
NOC and compared to a database containing images of known threats and known non-
threats. When a match to a known non-threat is received, the NOC operator will 
acknowledge the report and the system will maintain steady state operation. 
3. Visual Signal Criteria Met/ Facial Recognition Matches Threat  
Persons approaching the FOB are captured on video by the mobile UAV Swarm 
and /or the fixed video sensors along the FOB perimeter. The video is analyzed onboard 
the UAVs by a facial recognition program. Video received by the fixed sensors is sent to 
the NOC directly for analysis. The Facial recognition images captured are sent to the 
NOC and compared to a database containing images of known threats and known non-
threats. When a match to a known threat is received, the NOC operator will receive an 
alert, who will in turn alert the FOB to initiate threat protocols as well as Head Quarters 
for reporting requirements. In addition, the known threat will be labeled as an OI and 
initiate more intense observation by the Swarm UAVs until the threat is resolved.  
4. Visual Signal Criteria Met/ Facial Recognition No Match 
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Persons approaching the FOB are captured on video by the mobile UAV Swarm 
and /or the fixed video sensors along the FOB perimeter. The video is analyzed onboard 
the UAVs by a facial recognition program. Video received by the fixed sensors is sent to 
the NOC directly for analysis. The Facial recognition images captured are sent to the 
NOC and compared to a database containing images of known threats and known non-
threats. When the facial recognition data collected does not reveal a match when 
compared to the database, the Smart FOB Surveillance System (SFSS) will continue to 
track the contact and alert the NOC operator to determine the disposition of the contact as 
a threat or non-threat. The FOB reactionary force will investigate the contact to determine 
the threat level of the Object of Interest (OI). After the investigation, the NOC operator 
will update the database to reflect the threat level evaluated for that contact. 
5. Visual Signal Criteria Met/Behavior Abnormal 
In addition to threat evaluation by facial recognition comparison, the raw video 
from the fixed and mobile sensors is sent to the Network Operations Center (NOC) for 
behavior analysis. Behavior analysis is carried out comparing the movements of the 
tracks against threat criteria. Abnormal behaviors are considered as loitering, persons in 
prone positions, persons that appear to be traveling in a manner to not be detected, 
vehicles approaching the FOB, and other abnormal threats as defined by the operator. In 
these instances, the NOC operator will be alerted for disposition of the Object of Interest 
(OI). The FOB reactionary force will investigate the contact to determine the threat level 
of the Object of Interest (OI). 
6. Visual Signal Criteria Met/Behavior Normal 
Raw video data, collected by the fixed and mobile sensors, of contacts in the 
vicinity of the FOB that do not exhibit abnormal behavior will continue to be tracked and 
their behavior analyzed for abnormal behaviors. The system will maintain steady state 
surveillance operation. 
7. Audible Signal Criteria Met/ Behavior Abnormal 
The fixed sensor network located along the perimeter of the FOB passively 
receives audible signals. The audio received is sent to the NOC for threat criteria 
evaluation. To meet a threat criterion, the audio received is evaluated by the NOC against 
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audible threat profiles. When gunfire or on explosion is detected, the audio source will be 
located through simple triangulation based on the dB level of the various audio sensors 
receiving the signal. The NOC operator will be alerted who will in turn initiate FOB 
threat protocols, which may include the deployment of FOB reactionary force for further 
investigation. In addition, the contact will be labeled as an Object of Interest (OI) and be 
monitored by the Swarm UAVs at an elevated priority until the disposition of the threat is 
resolved.  
8. Audible Signal Criteria Met/Behavior Normal 
Audible signals that do not initially meet threat criteria will continue to be tracked 
and monitored by all other sensors as normal. The source of the audio will be located 
through simple triangulation based on the dB level of the various audio sensors receiving 
the signal. The NOC operator will determine the threat disposition of the audio detected 
and if it is determined that no threat exists, the Smart FOB Surveillance System (SFSS) 
will return to normal steady state operations. 
9. RF Signal Criteria Met/ Behavior Abnormal 
RF signals are passively received by the fixed sensor network located along the 
perimeter of the FOB. The RF received is sent to the NOC for threat criteria evaluation. 
To meet a threat criterion, the RF received is evaluated by the NOC against RF threat 
profiles. When jamming attempts, electronically guided munitions, electronically 
actuated Improvised Explosive Devices (IED), or other potentially threatening RF signals 
are detected, the RF source will be located through simple triangulation based on the dB 
level of the various audio sensors receiving the signal. The NOC operator will be alerted 
who will in turn initiate FOB threat protocols, which may include the deployment of FOB 
reactionary force for further investigation. In addition, the contact will be labeled as an 
Object of Interest (OI) and be monitored by the Swarm UAVs at an elevated priority until 
the disposition of the threat is resolved. 
10. RF Signal Criteria Met/Behavior Normal 
RF signals that do not initially meet threat criteria will continue to be tracked and 
monitored by all other sensors as normal. The source of the RF will be located through 
simple triangulation based on the dB level of the various audio sensors receiving the 
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signal. The NOC operator will determine the threat disposition of the RF detected and if 
it is determined that no threat exists, the Smart FOB Surveillance System (SFSS) will 
return to normal steady state operations. 
11. RF Signal Criteria Met/ Communication Intercept 
RF signals that are determined to be voice or data communications will be 
intercepted and evaluated by the NOC operator to determine the treat level. The location 
of the source will be determined by triangulation and labeled as an Object of Interest (OI) 
until the operator completes the threat disposition. If the source is considered a threat, 
FOB protocols will be initiated to combat the threat. If the source is determined to be 
non-threatening, then the Smart FOB Surveillance System (SFSS) will return to normal 
steady state operations. 
12. Global Intelligence Data Communication with Head Quarters 
The Network Operations Center (NOC) is in constant two-way communication 
with the FOBs Headquarters by way of a satellite data link, which is a service provided 
by the FOB infrastructure for the Smart FOB Surveillance System (SFSS). Global 
Intelligence Data is sent from Head Quarters to the FOB to alert the Network Operations 
Center (NOC) operator of impending threat alerts as well as updates to the NOC database 
for facial recognition, behavior analyses, audible threat profiles, RF threat profiles, and 
RF communications decryption. In addition, positive threat alerts by way of video, audio, 
RF, or NOC operator determination will automatically alert Head Quarters to initiate 
reporting of the threat condition to resolution. In situations where the NOC has 
discovered a new threat profile, the NOC will also update Global Intelligence data via 
Head Quarters. A new threat profile is a signal or Object of Interest (OI) previously 
determined to not be a threat criterion, but subsequently was determined to be potentially 
threatening. For example, a person who did not previously match the facial recognition 
database, but recently was determined to be a threat by the FOB reactionary force would 
now be entered into the facial recognition database. 
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E. EXTERNAL SYSTEMS DIAGRAM (ESD) 
From the operational scenarios, the External Systems Diagram (ESD) is 
developed. The ESD is a representation of the inter-relationship between the SFSS 
system and the external systems at the system boundaries with regard to the systems 
inputs, outputs, and constraints (Buede, 2000). The Integrated Definition for Function 
Modeling (IDEF0) format is used to depict the ESD for the Smart FOB Surveillance 
System (SFSS). The ESD (Figure 14) consists of five distinct parts: Constraints (FOB 
Standards and Environment) are listed at the top of the figure and constrain each 
function. System Functions are listed in the boxes (Provide Infrastructure for SFSS, 
Operate SFSS, Provide SFSS Services, Provide Global Intel for SFSS, and Maneuver 
within FOB Area of Operation). On the left side of each function are the inputs. The 
Smart FOB Surveillance System (SFSS) inputs are the outputs from the external systems. 
On the right side of each function are the outputs. The Smart FOB Surveillance System 
(SFSS) outputs are inputs to external systems. Finally, the bottom of the graphic shows 
the system and external systems (FOB, Operator, SFSS, Head Quarters, and Objects). 
 
Figure 14.  External Systems Diagram for SFSS 
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F. REQUIREMENTS 
 The requirements for the Smart FOB Surveillance System (SFSS) are an 
extension of the External Systems Diagram (ESD) discussed above. They are based on 
the operational concept, scenarios, as well as the External Systems Diagram (ESD) of the 
system and are broken down into three distinct categories: Input/output requirements, 
external systems requirements, and system constraint requirements. 
F.1.0—Input/output requirements 
F.1.1—Input requirements 
F.1.1.1—The Smart FOB Surveillance System shall receive the 
input Global Intel. 
F.1.1.2— The Smart FOB Surveillance System shall receive the 
input Infrastructure. 
F.1.1.3— The Smart FOB Surveillance System shall receive the 
input Operator Input. 
F.1.1.4—The Smart FOB Surveillance System shall receive the 
input Visual Signal. 
F.1.1.5— The Smart FOB Surveillance System shall receive the 
input Audio Signal. 
F.1.1.6— The Smart FOB Surveillance System shall receive the 
input RF Signal. 
F.1.2—Output requirements 
F.1.2.1— The Smart FOB Surveillance System shall provide the 
output Intel/Alerts. 
F.1.2.2— The Smart FOB Surveillance System shall provide the 
output Alerts. 
F.1.2.3— The Smart FOB Surveillance System shall provide the 
output Protection/Surveillance. 




F.2.0—External systems requirements 
F.2.1— The Smart FOB Surveillance System shall interface with the 
external system FOB. 
F.2.2— The Smart FOB Surveillance System shall interface with the 
external system Operator. 
F.2.3— The Smart FOB Surveillance System shall interface with the 
external system Head Quarters. 
F.2.4— The Smart FOB Surveillance System shall interface with the 
external system Objects. 
F.3.0—System constraint requirements 
F.3.1— The Smart FOB Surveillance System shall comply with 
constraints of FOB Standards. 
F.3.1— The Smart FOB Surveillance System shall comply with 
constraints of the Environment. 
G. GENERIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL ARCHITECTURE 
The functional architecture of a system contains the hierarchy of the functions 
performed. Those functions are then decomposed further from top-level functions to the 
bottom-level functions (Buede, 2009). Figure 15 depicts the functional architecture for 
the Smart FOB Surveillance System (SFSS). The functions are based on the requirements 
needed to implement a system that can perform the scenarios previously described. This 
generic functional architecture hierarchy will be used to carry out the mission of the 





Figure 15.  Generic Functional Architecture Hierarchy for SFSS 
The functional architecture outlines four key subfunctions that the Smart FOB 
Surveillance System (SFSS) must perform in order to provide surveillance and threat 
detection for a FOB. 
 Provide fixed sensor services 
 Provide smart mobile sensor services 
 Provide NOC services 
 Provide Swarm UAV Control 
 
The functional architecture decomposition is illustrated using IDEF0 modeling, 
beginning with the top function and then further decomposing each function into lower 
level functions. Figure 15 depicts four levels of function decomposition with inputs and 
outputs of each function. The top level function of ―Provide SFSS services‖ can be seen 
in Figure 16 below. Again, using an IDEF0 diagram, the top level function is located 
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inside the box. The constraints of environment and FOB standards are above the box, the 
inputs enter the box from the left, and the outputs exit the box to the right. 
 
Figure 16.  Top-level Function for the Generic System for SFSS 
The first level decomposition of the system function ―Provide SFSS Services‖ is 
depicted in the IDEF0 Figure 18. This diagram shows inputs and outputs between the 
first level functions and the constraints on these functions. The model demonstrates how 
data from the fixed and mobile sensors are received in order for the Network Operations 
Center (NOC) to generate alerts and ultimately warn the FOB of potential threats. The 
figure also depicts how global intelligence data from the FOBs headquarters can be 
received by the Smart FOB Surveillance System (SFSS). 
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Figure 17.  First-level Decomposition of the System Function Provide SFSS Services 
 for SFSS 
Figure 18 shows the decomposition of the function ―Provide Fixed Sensor 
Services.‖ This graphic depicts how the raw data inputs from the video, audio and RF 
sensors are received for further processing. The data received can also be heard and 
viewed in real-time by the operator for manual monitoring. The FOB infrastructure 
provides the necessary power requirements of the system as well as network connectivity 




Figure 18.  Decomposition of the Provide Fixed Sensor Services Function for SFSS 
Figure 19 shows the decomposition of the function ―Provide Mobile Sensor 
Services.‖ The mobile sensors are attached to the UAVs patrolling the perimeter. The 
video taken by the UAVs is first processed on board for facial recognition and database 
comparison. The video captured by the mobile sensors is also sent to the Network 
Operations Center (NOC) for further behavior analysis processing and for real-time 
viewing by the operator. 
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Figure 19.  Decomposition of the Provide Mobile Sensor Services Function for SFSS 
Figure 20 shows the decomposition of the Decomposition of the function 
―Provide NOC Services.‖ This figure shows the interface of the various sensors and the 
processing of the sensor data being received. The model also shows the system interface 
with the Network Operations Center (NOC) operator, headquarters, and the Smart FOB 
Surveillance System (SFSS). This decomposition also further describes how the FOB 
infrastructure supports the Smart FOB Surveillance System (SFSS). 
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Figure 20.  Decomposition of the Provide NOC Services Function for SFSS 
Figure 21 shows the decomposition of the ―Provide Swarm UAV Control‖ 
function. This function is performed inside the NOC, however, it is completely 
independent of NOC functions. The UAVs transmit their position data to Process Flight 
Instructions function via the NOC. The NOC also provides this function with alert data 
and intelligence data that would be considered when processing the proper flight paths 
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and organization of the UAVs during surveillance. The ―Process Flight Instructions‖ then 
computes the flight orders and transmits them to each UAV in the network via the 
communications function. 
 
Figure 21.  Decomposition of the Provide Swarm UAV Control Function for SFSS 
Figure 22 shows the decomposition of the ―Process Video‖ function. This 
function is performed locally on the individual Swarm UAV performing the function. 
The video captured is analyzed by facial recognition software and compared to a database 
within the identify function. The possible results are either a match to a known threat in 
which an alert will be generated, a match to a known non-threat in which no alert will be 
generated, or a non-match in which the operator must resolve by categorizing as friendly 





Figure 22.  Decomposition of the Process Video Function for SFSS 
Figure 23 shows the decomposition of the ―Process Sensor Data‖ function. This 
function receives the data from both the fixed and mobile sensors. Raw video and audio 
can be monitored directly by the Network Operations Center (NOC) operator. The data is 
analyzed for threat recognition in the predict function and if the threat criteria are met for 
a given signal, then an alert will be issued. In the case of RF signals identified as voice 
communications, the RF will be demodulated for listening by the operator. The react 
function, will issue alerts to both the operator and headquarters as well as prompt the 




Figure 23.  Decomposition of the Process Sensor Data Function for SFSS 
H. GENERIC SYSTEM PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE 
The physical architecture shown in Figure 24 is modeled in hierarchal format. It 
defines the resources that map to each individual function illustrated in the functional 
architecture hierarchy.  This graphic depicts how the Smart FOB Surveillance System 
(SFSS) decomposes from the entire system, to subsystems, components, and software 
modules. 
Within the SFSS, the three high level systems are the Fixed Sensor system, Smart 
Mobile Sensor System, and the NOC System. In the subsequent sections, the vision of the 






Figure 24.  Generic Physical Architecture Hierarchy for SFSS 
1. The Fixed Sensor System 
The Fixed Sensor System is composed of three distinct sensor types. Other sensor 
types can be added in future development or to adapt to other applications. However, in a 
FOB application these were determined to provide the most fundamental level of 
surveillance and protection based on known threats. The three types of sensors chosen are 
video sensors, audio sensors, and radio frequency sensors. The sensor clusters will be 
physically mounted along the perimeter of the FOB to provide 360-degree coverage. The 
Fixed Sensor System also contains a communications component, which provides two 
types of signals (discussed in the functional hierarchy) by way of an Ethernet cable 
connected directly between the sensor and the Network Operations Center (NOC) server. 
a. Video Sensor Component 
Figure 25 is a picture of the Super Night Vision Outdoor AF 30X Zoom 
Camera. This camera has the features of the video sensor envisioned in the Smart FOB 
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Surveillance System (SFSS). It is capable of capturing raw video at the fidelity needed 
for facial recognition and behavior analysis applications. Although not a complete list of 
the cameras features, the following are highlights that demonstrate compatibility with the 
Smart FOB Surveillance System (SFSS): 
 It is fully weather proof and can withstand extreme environmental 
temperatures. 
 It is compatible with a typical FOB infrastructure. 
 It has an effective range for facial recognition software of 3000 
feet. 
 It has an Infra-red (IR) Video range of 300 feet. 
 It internally contains intelligent control technology to provide the 
best possible resolution for the given environment. 
 
 




b. Audio Sensor Component 
There are several differing technologies in todays long range listening 
devices. The different approaches to distance microphones result in different advantages. 
Some are able to focus on a very specific narrow target while others can detect noise over 
a large area. Examples of the three most advanced and most prevalent are shown in 
Figure 26 below. Acoustical amplification as seen on the left side of the figure, 
concentrates sound waves into a parabolic dish along a wide angled vector. Specialized 
software is capable of filtering out background noise as well as amplifying the signal. 
Shotgun microphones also seen in the figure below operate similarly to acoustical 
amplification; however, they sample a very narrow direction of sound and are primarily 
tuned to frequencies in the human voice spectrum. They are used primarily to listen to 
conversations. Reflective amplification and demodulation devices serve the same purpose 
as shotgun microphones as they also detect noise along a narrow band and they do so at a 
much greater range. They are based on the principle that sound waves will modulate a 
high frequency beam of energy when they interact. When these modulated beams are 
reflected back, the signal is demodulated by the device leaving the resulting sound 
detected. The carrier signal can be in the microwave, infrared, or laser spectrums (Mes 
Innovations, 2005). 
 
Figure 26.  Long Range Listening Devices (From Mesinnovation.com, 2005) 
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For the purposes of the Smart FOB Surveillance System (SFSS) the type 
of long range listening device most functional is an acoustical amplification device with a 
fitted parabolic dish. The purpose of the audio sensor in this system is not to detect 
sounds along a narrow width or to even detect and listen to voices at a distance, but rather 
to detect sounds in as wide a band as possible at a fidelity that can then be compared to a 
database of sounds that signify a contact of interest. These sounds can then be processed 
for threat determination and directionality, and the location of the source can be 
triangulated. 
c. RF Sensor Component 
Figure 27 is the Agilent N6841A RF Sensor. This sensor provides the 
radio frequency detection capabilities needed by the Smart FOB Sensor System (SFSS). 
It is capable of capturing a wide spectrum of radio frequencies used for identification and 
analysis. This particular model houses its own proprietary software, which allows it, 
when used in concert with additional sensors, to triangulate the RF source location. The 
following are some characteristics of this device that make it an ideal sensor for the 
Smart FOB Surveillance System (SFSS) (Agilent Technologies, Inc., 2000–2013): 
 It is weather proof and can withstand temperatures -15°C to 55°C. 
 It is compatible with a typical FOB infrastructure. 
 It has an effective range of 3 km. 
 It contains a 20 MHz to 6 GHz Wideband RF receiver with 20MHz 
bandwidth. 
 It has two wide dynamic range switched RF inputs. 




Figure 27.  Agilent N6841A RF Sensor  
(From Agilent Technologies, Inc., 2000–2013) 
d. Communications Component 
The communications component of the fixed sensor system is the Ethernet 
cabling that runs from the sensor locations along the perimeter of the FOB to the 
Network Operations Center (NOC). It is required to transfer the data received by the 
sensors to the NOC and to provide operator interface with the sensors when required. To 
ensure compatibility, other components may need to be added depending on which the 
sensor manufacturer and the software used. 
2. The Smart Mobile Sensor System 
The Smart Mobile Sensor System contains a video sensing component, a video 
processor, and a communications component. All three of these components are 
contained internally to each UAV in the swarm. Figure 28 is the Dragon Flyer X6 as an 




Figure 28.  Dragon Flyer X6 (From Draganfly Innovations Inc., 2013) 
The on board video camera is a lightweight Panasonic TM-900 that captures data 
at 60fps, with a resolution of 1080p, and effective range of 2km. The video can be stored 
on a 60Gb hard drive, which correlates to about 5 hours of video or processed and 
transmitted directly via an FM data link that is supported by the Smart FOB Surveillance 
System (SFSS) (Draganfly Innovations Inc., 2013). Video processing and the initial 
analysis of the video is done on board the UAV. Internally, the UAV contains enough 
processing and storage capability to house the detection and identification software 
modules.  
 The FM data link operates in the 20–25 MHz of bandwidth, which can give 
connectivity to about 75 miles. However, due to the power restriction as a result of 
limited battery weight capacity this is reduced can be reduced to about 5 miles, which 
provides the intended swarm UAV coverage area around the FOB. The FM data link  
provides the interface for the NOC operator as well as the ability to transmit processed 
data to the NOC as discussed. In addition, the FM data link provides the UAV with flight 
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instructions with the NOC acting as the swarm node that receives flight information from 
all UAVs and then transmits flight directions back to each UAV. 
3. The NOC System 
 The Network Operations Center (NOC) System is the control center for the Smart 
FOB Surveillance System and comprises the majority of the processing and analysis of 
the sensor outputs. The Operator Interface Component and the Headquarters Interface 
Component will consist of multiple LCD displays for ease of use and a keyboard to enter 
data manually into the system in order acknowledge alerts and interface with 
headquarters, and a headset and speakers for voice communications and audio signal 
listening. The Fixed Sensor Input Component, Mobile Sensor Input Component, the 
Sensor Data Processor Component, and associated DIPR software Modules are housed in 
a server rack in the NOC. The FOB Utilities Component is made up of hardware that 
ensures compatibility between the FOB infrastructure and the NOC and will be uniquely 
tailored for the given NOC. Figure 29 depicts the NOC System physical architecture.  
 
Figure 29.  NOC System Components 
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I. GENERIC SYSTEM OPERATIONAL ARCHITECTURE 
The operational architecture is where the physical and functional architecture of 
the Smart FOB Surveillance System (SFSS) meet. Table 1 shows how each element of 
the functional architecture matches to a function: system, subsystem, component, or 
module of the physical architecture. It is the complete description of the Smart FOB 
Surveillance System (SFSS) design. There are no unneeded physical parts. The 
operational architecture also shows that functions are carried out in the physical design. 
 
Functional Architecture Physical Architecture 
A.0 Provide SFSS Services A.0 Smart FOB Surveillance System of Systems 
A.1 Provide Fixed Sensor Services A.1 Fixed Sensor System 
A.1.1 Communications A.1.1 Communications Component 
A.1.2 Sense Video A.1.2 Video Sensor Component 
A.1.3 Sense Audio A.1.3 Audio Sensor component 
A.1.4 Sense RF A.1.4 Sense RF Component 
A.2 Provide Smart Mobile Sensor Services A.2 Smart Mobile Sensor System 
A.2.1 Sense Video A.2.1 Video Sensor Component 
A.2.2 Process Video A.2.2 Video Processor Component 
A.2.2.1 Detect A.2.2.1 Detection Software Module 
A.2.2.2 Identify A.2.2.2 Identification Software Module 
A.2.3 Communications A.2.3 Communications Component 
A.3 Provide NOC Services A.3 NOC System 
A.3.1 Interface with Operator A.3.1 Operator Interface Component 
A.3.2 Receive Fixed Sensor input A.3.2  Fixed Sensor Input Component 
A.3.3 Receive Mobile Sensor Input A.3.3 Mobile Sensor Input Component 
A.3.4 Process Sensor Data A.3.4 Sensor Data Processor Component 
A.3.4.1 Detect A.3.4.1 Detection Software Module 
A.3.4.2 Identify A.3.4.2 Identification Software Module 
A.3.4.3 Predict A.3.4.3 Prediction Software Module 
A.3.4.4 React A.3.4.4 Reaction Software Module 
A.3.5 Interface with Head Quarters A.3.5 Head Quarters Interface Component 
A.3.6 Receive Utilities from FOB A.3.6 FOB Utilities Component 
A.4 Provide Swarm UAV Control A.4 Swarm UAV System 
A.4.1 Process Flight Instructions A.4.1 Flight Instructions Component 
A.4.2 Communications A.4.2 Communications Component 
 
Table 2.   Operational Architecture Matrix for SFSS 
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This chapter used the left side of the Systems Engineering Vee model to develop 
the required Systems Engineering products. Once the operational need an operational 
concept were derived, the various operational scenarios were defined that that were used 
to bound and scope the system. From there additional Systems Engineering products 
were developed. The External Systems Diagram led to the requirements of the system. 

















VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
The current method for FOB surveillance is manpower intense and unnecessarily 
dangerous. In our current operational environment we do not have the resources to 
reliably detect and recognize threats. There exists a critical need for autonomous 
continuous surveillance of vulnerable targets such as Forward Operating Bases (FOB). A 
formal analysis of this problem was performed using the systems engineering design 
approach. The systems engineering ―V‖ model was used to develop the operational 
requirements and operational concept. From this a list of operational scenarios were 
developed to scope the system by creating the boundaries of the tasks the Smart FOB 
Surveillance System (SFSS) was to perform. From the scenarios, an External Systems 
Diagram was developed to illustrate how the system was to interface with the external 
systems of FOB. Requirements were then established for the system . By establishing the 
requirements of the system the Functional Architecture Hierarchy was developed. Each 
function contained within was then decomposed to the most basic processes, showing 
how inputs, outputs and constraints trace through the functions, using IDEF0 modling. In 
order to further define the system, the Physical Architecture Hierarchy was then 
developed. Finally, an Operational Hierarchy matrix was created to map each function to 
a subsystem, component, or software module. 
B. CONCLUSION 
This thesis demonstrates that a highly intelligent and autonomous surveillance and 
detection system will greatly enhance security and safety of a Forward Operating Base 
(FOB). This research shows that the possibility exists to improve the agility and 
effectiveness of such a system on many fronts, as compared to traditional systems that 
rely heavily on available resources and manpower to operate. In addition, those 
traditional systems have an innately high degree of error due to their many human 
interfaces. This is in stark contrast to the potential created when the human interfaces and 
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functions performed by humans are replaced with Intelligent Automation (IA). IA 
improves the detection quality and minimizes the quantity of people required. 
The utilization of Swarm UAVs to act as a mobile sensor platform greatly 
enhances agility and efficiency. Operators are no longer required to operate the UAVs, 
nor walk the FOB surrounding areas for surveillance, which is extremely dangerous. 
Instead, these UAV platforms will operate independently and autonomously to react in 
their environment and the objects of interest in the battle space. This automation will 
result in more efficient patrol patterns, provide more coverage of an area, and react more 
quickly to potential threats. Multi-Agent Systems and Distributed Intelligence is 
incorporated by spreading out computing and processing requirements throughout many 
of the subsystems. This improves bandwidth efficiency and reduces the possibility for 
data and processing bottlenecks leading to a much more agile system. Utilizing the DIPR 
concept again reduces human interface. Raw sensor data can be processed in an 
intelligent system much faster than a trained operator. Use of DIPR eliminates most of 
the mundane tasks performed by a human operator in order manipulate the data to the 
point that it is actually useful. In addition, the concept of behavior analysis, in the 
Prediction subsystem of the DIPR system, greatly improves reaction time. This behavior 
analysis algorithm detects certain predefined behaviors; this is an area of significant 
research where ―learning‖ behaviors in an area of operations is underway; with learning, 
the operator will not need to input predefined known behaviors.  
These improvements in traditional surveillance, monitoring, and threat 
recognition methods are also done at lower man-power requirements to the commanders 
deploying such system. This all leads to FOB commanders having much better situational 
awareness, which in turn improves their ability to protect their FOB and assets as well as 





 Much more work is required to further the research performed while developing 
this thesis in order to realize an actual working system. While this thesis focused on the 
left side of the Systems Engineering V-model, the right side of the model must be 
followed as well. This will include the detailed design and implementation for the 
development of a prototype followed by integration, testing and evaluation, and fielding. 
These systems engineering products can then be scaled to a real-world systems solution 
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